Intellectual Property Arbitrage:
How Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections
Pamela Samuelsont

Differences in national intellectualproperty rules may cause economic activity to shift from
one jurisdiction to another so that a higher-protectionrule will be undermined by lower-protection
rules of other jurisdictions.This Essay illustratesthis with four examples: different rules on the enforceability of anti-reverse engineering clauses of software licenses, the protectability of bioengineered research tools, peer-to-peer file sharing,and exceptions to anticircumvention rules. It
considers several options nations may have to respond to such intellectualproperty arbitrage,none
of which is likely to be very effective.

I.

DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL RULES ENABLE IP ARBITRAGE

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-

erty Rights (TRIPS), concluded in 1994, has narrowed the range of issues on which nations can adopt differing IP rules. All World Trade

Organization (WTO) member nations, for example, must now protect
computer programs by copyright law.' Yet TRIPS plainly contemplates

continued differences in national laws by signaling that nations are
free to adopt higher-protection rules than the required minima

(which presumably means they need not do so). Nations are also "free
to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions
of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice."' TRIPS

restricts national autonomy by forbidding nations from treating foreigners less well than their own nationals, but this implicitly "accept[s]
the proposition that states may differ in their substantive laws."' Other
TRIPS provisions recognize that member states can adopt IP rules "in
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare" and "to promote
f Chancellor's Professor of Law and Information Management, Boalt Hall, University of
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I
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Apr 15,
1994), Art 10(1), reprinted in The Legal Texts: Results of the Uruguay Round of MultilateralTrade
Negotiations Annex IC at 325 (Cambridge 1994).
2
See id Art 1(1) at 322 ("Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their
law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection
does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.").
3
Id.
4
See id Art 3 at 323.
5 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, William o. Hennessey, and Shira Perlmutter, InternationalIntellectual Property Law and Policy § 2.06 at 79 (LexisNexis 2001).
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the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-

economic and technological development."' That significant variations
in national laws continue to exist a decade after TRIPS should not be
surprising given the diversity of countries' social, economic, and legal
traditions; stages of development; and cultures.

Nations have incentives to adopt higher-protection rules when an
already innovative domestic sector demonstrates a need for stronger
rules to enable firms to recoup R&D investments, or when nations believe that doing so will spur investments and economic development
in that field of innovation! Nations have incentives to adopt lower-

protection rules if they are predominantly users or net importers of
products of that kind, if they aspire to incentivize investments in follow-on innovation, or if they believe that a lower-protection rule will

induce more investments than a higher-protection rule.
National differences in IP rules may be unproblematic when the
differing rules do not undermine domestic protections. If country A

protects a certain innovation (say, patents for higher life forms) and
country B does not, country A may be willing to accept that country
B's rule is different as long as it can stop at the border any products
from B that would infringe its nationals' IP rights. Firms can set up
R&D facilities in country A and hope to recoup R&D expenses by

exploiting the innovation in A's market. They have at least partial protection in the global market.'
One country's decision to provide more extensive protection than
TRIPS requires can produce large externalities for the rest of the
TRIPS Arts 7-8 at 324 (cited in note 1).
See, for example, Pamela Samuelson, Implications of the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of IntellectualProperty Rights for Cultural Dimensions of National Copyright Laws, 23 J
Cultural Econ 95 (1999).
8
Higher-protection rules may also be manifestations of public choice problems with IP
legislation insofar as innovative industries are well organized, well funded, and well situated to
benefit significantly from higher-protection rules, making it reasonable to invest in legislation to
increase protections to higher levels. Because of the distributed costs of higher-protection rules,
collective action problems may prevent those who will bear those costs from organizing effectively to block higher-protection legislation.
9
The E.U. was a net importer of software when it adopted the Council Directive 91/250 of
14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 34 Off J Eur Communities (L 122)
42 (May 17, 1991) (EU Software Directive) (establishing uniform protections for software in the
E.U.). The E.U. hoped its rules would enable E.U. firms to engage in follow-on innovation by developing software that would interoperate with U.S. software. See Jonathan Band and Masanobu
Katoh, Interfaces on Trial: Intellectual Propertyand Interoperabilityin the Global Software Industry 229-44 (Westview 1995) (describing the legislative history of the E.U. Software Directive and
the goal of the Directive to "demonstrate support for interoperability and competition. which
copyright protection ...would frustrate").
10 The U.S. decision to grant more extensive patent protection for biotechnological innovations than other nations has caused some German biotech firms to set up R&D facilities in the
United States. See Susan K. Sell. Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual
Property Rights 112 n 16 (Cambridge 2003).
6

7
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world. Innovators may be able to recoup investments by selling products in the market where the high-protection rule applies, but they
cannot expect to have the same advantage in the world market. Protection in one or a small number of nations necessarily creates a voluntary outflow of profit from the country's own users to foreign innovators without a reciprocal inflow from foreign users to domestic innovators. What is remarkable is that some countries nevertheless do
this.
But legal rules in foreign jurisdictions can sometimes limit the
force of IP rights in the domestic country. That is, sometimes country
B's decision not to protect an innovation, or to protect it less strongly
than A, has spillover effects for country A. Country B's decision may,
moreover, attract domestic and foreign investments. As Part III will
show, country A may not always be able to prevent products developed in country B from entering its market. Unless country A can persuade all nations to harmonize on its higher-protection rule, a lowerprotection rule in even one jurisdiction may undermine A's rule. Innovators may either have protection everywhere (because A persuaded all nations to adopt its rule) or effectively nowhere (because
the lower-protection rule undermines A's rule). This is the IP arbitrage
issue on which this Essay principally focuses.
That differences in national IP rules can affect arbitrage is easily
illustrated." Australia currently facilitates arbitrage by permitting the
importation of certain IP products (for example, CDs of recorded music) from countries where these products can be purchased at a lower
price (say, Thailand) than the recording industry wishes to be the prevailing price in Australia; the arbitrageurs' competition reduces the local authorized sellers' rents. The U.S. has put pressure on Australia to
ban such parallel imports.'2 Because no consensus exists about
whether national exhaustion of rights" (the rule preferred by U.S.
trade officials) or international exhaustion (the Australian-preferred
rule) is the "best" rule," the negotiations leading up to TRIPS did not
11 See, for example, Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 Chi
Kent L Rev 943,945,969-72 (1998) (discussing competition among nations as to IP rules).
12 See, for example, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2002 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers:Australia10-11, online at http://www.ustr.gov/reportsl
nte/2002/australia.PDF (visited Nov 4, 2003) (discussing the practice of parallel importation in
Australia).
13 For an explanation of exhaustion of rights, see World Intellectual Property Association,
International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation, online at http://www.wipo.org/sme/en/
ip-business/export/internationalexhaustion.htm (visited Nov 4, 2003).
14 Trade and IP perspectives on this issue point in opposite directions. Trade experts would
logically favor international exhaustion because this rule permits goods to flow more freely in
the global market, while IP experts often favor national or regional exhaustion because these
rules help IP owners recoup R&D expenses. See, for example, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and
Andreas F Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute
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resolve the international debate on this particular type of IP arbitrage." If national approaches to the exhaustion of rights issue differ,
arbitrage will occur.
The IP arbitrage that is the main focus of this Essay resembles

classic arbitrage in that it impairs the ability to maintain a higherprotection rule (or higher price) in one location because market participants can take advantage of a lower-protection rule (or lower
price) elsewhere. "
II. EFFECTS OF DIFFERING RULES ON
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MARKETS

This Part discusses four examples of IP arbitrage. In each, highprotection domestic rules may be undermined by lower-protection

foreign rules that can plausibly be justified as a legitimate national
policy choice.
A. Software License Terms Prohibiting Reverse Engineering
Suppose that a country (say, the U.S.) decides to enforce terms of
software licenses that prohibit reverse engineering." A nation might
do so to enable domestic developers of proprietary software to protect internal program interfaces as trade secrets, or simply to promote
freedom of contract values."
Other nations (say, the European Union) may allow software reverse engineering for interoperability purposes and refuse to enforce
license restrictions on reverse engineering.'" Such a rule may foster
competition and follow-on innovation in its domestic software mar-

ket.2"'

Resolution Together, 37 Va J Intl L 275,280 n 12 (1997) (noting the tension at the TRIPS talks between the free-trade goals of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
WTO, and TRIPS's goal of protecting intellectual property rights).
15 See id; TRIPS Art 6 at 324 (cited in note 1) ("[Nlothing in this Agreement shall be used
to address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights.").
16 See, for example, A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage,
in Brian Kahin and Charles Nessen, eds, Borders in Cyberspace: Information Policy and the
Global Information Infrastructure 129, 142-54 (MIT 1997) (describing examples of regulatory
arbitrage such as the E.U.'s practice of limiting transborder data flows to countries with comparable data protection laws).
17 Compare Vault Corp v Quaid Software Ltd, 847 F2d 255,269-70 (5th Cir 1988) (holding
anti-reverse engineering clauses unenforceable), with Bowers v Baystate Technologies; Inc, 320
F3d 1317, 1323 (Fed Cir 2003) (holding anti-reverse engineering clauses enforceable).
18 See Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 Yale L J 1575, 1607-30 (2002) (discussing reasons why firms adopt proprietary
interfaces and assessing economic effects of reverse engineering and contractual restrictions on
reverse engineering).
19 See EU Software Directive Arts 6(1), 9(1) at 45 (cited in note 9).
20
See, for example, Thomas Vinje, The Legislative History of the EC Software Directive, in
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Foreign developers who obtain U.S. software can reverse engineer it in the E.U. to make compatible products. The resulting software may then be marketed in the U.S. as well as European markets
as long as the compatible software does not infringe U.S. copyrights."
The lower-protection European rule would create incentives for U.S.based software developers, as well as E.U. developers, to set up reverse engineering facilities in the E.U. for development of compatible
products.
Thus, a foreign rule in favor of reverse engineering may foil a
domestic strategy in favor of protecting platforms with proprietary interfaces. The domestic rule enforcing anti-reverse engineering license
terms may just shift development offshore-disadvantaging certain
domestic innovators but perhaps increasing competition and ongoing
innovation.
B.

Products of Research Tools

If a bio-engineered research tool is patented in one nation (say,
the U.S.), but not in other countries,22 the patentee may find it difficult
to control commercially valuable uses of the tools not only in the
markets in which no patent has issued, but even in the market in
which it was patented.
The main utility of bio-engineered research tools is in developing
bio-engineered products, such as drugs or enzymes. If a foreign national obtains a U.S.-patented bio-engineered research tool and uses it
outside of the U.S. to develop a commercial drug, the foreign firm can
sell the drug developed with the research tool not only in foreign
markets in which the tool is not patented, but also in the U.S. market.
While the U.S. has forbidden importation of products made outside
the U.S. with a U.S.-patented process since 1988,"' it does not forbid
importation of products made outside the U.S. with U.S.-patented
products."
M. Lehmann and C.E Tapper, eds, A Handbook of European Software Law 39,61-63 (Clarendon
1993) (discussing the competition policy rationale for the interoperability provisions of the E.U.
Software Directive).
21 See, for example, Computer Associates International, Inc v Altai, lnc, 982 F2d 693,701-15
(2d Cir 1992) (stating that interfaces are not protected by copyright law).
22 A bio-engineered research tool might be unpatentable for a number of reasons. See, for
example, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights. Integrating Intellectual Property Rights
and Development Policy: Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 22-24 (2002)
(urging developing countries to develop stringent rules as to the patenting of research tools);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg and Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q J 1 (1996)
(discussing various reasons to question the patentability of some research tools).
23 See 35 USC § 271(g) (2000).
24 See, for example, Bayer AG v Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 340 F3d 1367, 1377 (Fed Cir
2003) (holding that § 271(g) applies only to importation of physical goods, not importation of
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Thus, the domestic protection of research tools may only shift

their use to other countries. The tool's proprietor may effectively have
no protection, as the tool is unlikely to be used where it is protected.
The lack of protection in even one nation may be tantamount to a lack
of protection everywhere in the world."
C.

Country Codes

Developers of computer games may try to enhance their profits
by embedding country or region codes so that their games will play
only on platforms embedded with the same code. This allows gamemakers to sell the same product at different prices in different countries.
Some countries (say, the U.S.) may outlaw circumvention of technical measures, such as country codes, on the theory that strict rules
against circumvention will protect game developers from "piracy"
(that is, widespread infringement). 6 Foreign jurisdictions (say, Finland)
might adopt weaker anticircumvention rules-for example, allowing

purchasers of digital products to bypass country codes so they can
play games on a platform of their choice 27-on the ground that country
coding (and concomitant price discrimination) is anticompetitive."

data); Amgen, Inc v United States International Trade Commission, 902 F2d 1532, 1538-40 (Fed
Cir 1990) (refusing to stop importation of an artificial hormone made abroad using U.S.patented cells, because cells are a "product" rather than a "process").
25 Another type of IP arbitrage arising out of differing patent rules may occur when some
countries embrace, and others deny, research exceptions to patent infringement. Follow-on innovators may decide to establish R&D facilities in countries with such exceptions. Otherwiseinfringing research may result in the development of noninfringing new products, which may
then be imported to compete with the patentee and its licensees. Exempting research and experimental uses of inventions from the scope of the patent right has achieved considerable acceptance in the international community. See, for example, Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research
Tools. 76 Wash L Rev 1,37-40 (2001).
26
See 17 USC § 1201 (a)(1)(A) (2000) ("No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title."): Sony Computer Entertainment America Inc v Gamemasters, 87 F Supp 2d 976,987 (ND Cal 1999) (deeming the bypass
of a country code a § 1201(a)(1)(A) violation). But see R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access
Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18 Berkeley
Tech L J 619 (2003) (criticizing the treatment of country codes as persistent access controls under § 1201(a)(1)(A)).
27 Finland proposed to allow circumvention of technical measures for private purposes so
long as the person had lawful access to the work. See email from Ville Oksanen, Researcher,
Helsinki Institute for Information Technology (Nov 18,2002) (on file with author).
28
See, for example, Michael Owen-Brown, Regulator Challenges DVD Zones, The Advertiser (Australia) 27 (May 24, 2001) (reporting Australian investigation of DVD country coding
spurred by market allocation and discriminatory pricing concerns). See also Joint Answer to
Written Questions E-1509/00 and E-1510/00 given by Mr. Monti on behalf of the Commission,44
Off J Eur Communities (C 53) 157-59 (Feb 20, 2001) (addressing E.U. competition concerns
about country coding of DVD players).
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A weaker anticircumvention rule in Finland may mean that the
price prevailing there will be the lowest price available anywhere, undermining game-makers' price discrimination strategies.
Moreover, insofar as global digital networks permit nationals of a
lower-protection jurisdiction to disseminate the means to bypass
country codes, the game-makers' price discrimination could be undermined worldwide.2'
The welfare effects of IP arbitrage that undermines price discrimination are unclear. Price discrimination can, of course, enhance
consumer welfare by increasing the total number of users; overall use
of an IP product may fall if the producers' price discrimination regime
collapses."' However, price discrimination in IP markets is not always
benign,' and TRIPS contemplates that nations can prevent abuses of
IP rights. 2 Country coding achieves technologically what national exhaustion of rights rules would otherwise achieve, and if nations under
TRIPS are free to adopt international exhaustion rules, they should
also have discretion to adopt anticircumvention rules to achieve the
same objective.
D.

Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Technologies

Peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing technologies are widely used to
exchange digital music in the MP3 file format." Downloading digital
music without paying for it, as P2P technology permits, may constitute
copyright infringement.4 While developers of P2P software are typi-

29 DeCSS. a computer program designed to bypass the Content Scramble System (CSS)
used to enforce DVD region coding, is widely available on the Internet. See, for example, David
S. Touretzky. Gallery of CSS Descramblers, online at http://www-2.cs.cmu.edul-dstIDeCSS/
Gallery/index.html (visited Nov 4,2003) (cataloging more than thirty different versions of the
DeCSS code, including graphical and musical versions).
30 See, for example. William T. Fisher III,
Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 Chi
Kent L Rev 1203. 1238-40 (1998) (explaining the socially beneficial distributive effects of price
discrimination).
31 See, for example, Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 Cardozo L Rev 55.67, 93 (2001) (noting as an example that price discrimination for entertainment
products results in a net transfer from poorer consumers to wealthier shareholders).
32 See TRIPS Art 8(2) at 324 (cited in note 1)("Appropriate measures, provided that they
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.").
33 See. for example, Benny Evangelista. Net Music Swappers Fear Wrath of Industry, San
Fran Chron Al (July 25,2003) (estimating 60 million people in the U.S. have used P2P software
to download digital music).
See In re Ainster Copyright Litigation. 334 F3d 643.653 (7th Cir 2003) (upholding a pre3
liminary injunction on the ground that a P2P developer was unable to articulate noninfringing
use of its product): A&M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc. 239 F3d 1004. 1014-19 (9th Cir 2001) (concluding that Napster users had engaged in copyright infringement).
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cally not directly liable, the recording industry has charged P2P developers with indirect copyright infringement on various theories."
P2P technology creates another IP arbitrage opportunity. Suppose courts in country A (say, the U.S.) decide that makers of such
technologies are indirect infringers," but courts in country B (say, the
Netherlands) decide that they are not because of substantial noninfringing uses of these technologies." Courts in country A cannot enforce a judgment against a foreign maker of P2P technologies in the
absence of domestic assets; furthermore, enjoining the foreign P2P developer will fail to stop domestic users from accessing the technology
from foreign sites via the Internet."
The principal result of national differences on indirect copyright
liability rules may be to shift development of P2P technologies offshore." The development and distribution of P2P technologies will not

stop unless they are banned in all countries."'

35 See, for example, Napster, 239 F3d at 1019-24 (affirming contributory infringement and
vicarious liability findings against a P2P developer and granting a preliminary injunction).
36
See, for example, id. But see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd, 259 F
Supp 2d 1029, 1043, 1046 (CD Cal 2003) (granting P2P developers summary judgment on secondary copyright infringement claims against them because of substantial noninfringing uses).
37
See, for example, Brian Grow, Netherlands Court Ruling Offers Haven to File-Sharing
Services, Wall St J B7 (Dec 18, 2002) (describing a Dutch appellate court ruling that developers
of file-sharing software were not liable for copyright infringement, even if their users might be).
See also Timothy Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 Va L Rev 679,734-37 (2003) (discussing the effect of legal rulings such as Napster on decisions about the architecture of subsequent P2P systems).
38
See, for example, Burk, 73 Chi Kent L Rev at 960 (cited in note 11) ("[Blecause of the
Internet, interdiction of infringing products may become nearly impossible.").
39 This helps to explain why some P2P developers have moved their headquarters to remote locations. See Wu, 89 Va L Rev at 736 (cited in note 37) (noting that KaZaA's parent company is incorporated in Vanuatu, while Grokster's servers are located in Nevis).
40 Highly decentralized software systems may continue to be used even if developers have
shut down their operations. See Grokster, 259 F Supp 2d at 1045:

Defendants provide software that communicates across networks that are entirely outside
Defendants [sic] control. In the case of Grokster, the network is the propriety [sic] FastTrack network, which is clearly not controlled by Defendant Grokster. In the case of
StreamCast, the network is Gnutella, the open-source nature of which apparently places it
outside the control of any single entity.
Another example of IP arbitrage involving digital copyrights is the streaming of digital content
that is unlawful in one jurisdiction (say, the U.S.) but lawful in another (say, Canada); streaming
services could locate servers in Canada, but attract U.S. residents who access the streamed content online, thereby creating an opportunity for arbitrage. One effort to exploit differences in national rules about streaming digital content resulted in the higher-protection rule prevailing over
the lower-protection rule. See Gerry Blackwell, iCrave Just a Hint of Things to Come, Toronto
Star (Mar 9,2000) (describing the shuttering of Canadian web rebroadcasting service iCrave in
response to lawsuits filed by U.S. copyright owners alleging violations of U.S. copyright law).
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E. Factors Affecting IP Arbitrage
A foreign rule's undermining of domestic protection via IP arbitrage is not inevitable. A given form of IP arbitrage is less likely if it
involves physical goods that must be transported in a traditional manner (for example, by ships, trucks, or airplanes) such that infringements can readily be detected by examining the goods at the border.
Information technologies are more susceptible to IP arbitrage owing
to their more intangible nature, the relative invisibility of the key innovations they embody, and the ease of transmitting many of them via
the Internet." Derivative innovations that do not bear the imprint of
infringement in the product being distributed (say, drugs made with
the aid of research tools) are also more susceptible to IP arbitrage.
III.

POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO IP ARBITRAGE AND
ATTENDANT DIFFICULTIES

A nation that objects to a form of IP arbitrage that undermines
its domestic policy has several options. First, it can change its domestic
law to broaden import controls or expand the extraterritorial reach of
domestic law. Second, it can pressure the "rogue" nation to synchronize rules. Third, it can initiate a complaint against the other nation
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the TRIPS
Agreement. Fourth, it can propose amendments to the TRIPS Agreement to achieve a finer degree of harmonization of minimum standards. Fifth, it can close off trade or communication to protect its domestic rules. Sixth, it can accept that some IP arbitrage may be inevitable and adjust its expectations about the benefits it will be able to
derive from TRIPS. Various difficulties attend each option. None is
likely to be a foolproof solution to IP arbitrage.
A. Enhancing Domestic Protections
An obvious step for a nation to take in response to IP arbitrage is
to amend domestic laws to block that arbitrage. As to products made
elsewhere from research tools patented domestically, for example, a
nation could ban importation of products made with the aid of domestically patented research tools. As to interoperable software, a nation
could change its copyright laws to prohibit importation of computer
programs developed in violation of a mass-market license outside that
nation. Also possible is legislation authorizing an expansion of the extraterritorial reach of domestic law.
One precedent for expanding domestic law to stop IP arbitrage is
Section 271(g) of the U.S. patent law, which forbids the importation
41

Consider Burk, 73 Chi Kent L Rev at 944-45 (cited in note 11).
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and sale of products made from processes patented in the United

States.42 This provision's potential to disrupt domestic businesses
sparked controversy when initially proposed. Retailers not only
"feared [the abuse of] extended process patent protection ... to harass
sellers of products legitimately produced by noninfringing processes"
abroad, but also faced liability for selling imported products while un-

aware of the infringing process by which they were made-a liability
that might have extended to "unwitting" downstream purchasers." To
address these concerns, Congress limited the reach of Section 271(g)
by shielding noncommercial uses and retail sales," and exempted
products materially changed by subsequent processes and products

that are trivial components of other products9
Similar resistance may arise if nations try to ban importation of
products of research tools, unlicensed interoperable software, or the
like-especially if domestic support for the stronger-protection rule is
weak or equivocal. For example, even if some software developers,
such as Microsoft, would support amendments to U.S. copyright law

favoring enforcement of license restrictions on reverse engineering of
software, such amendments would be opposed by other firms, such as

Sun Microsystems, that support reverse engineering.' Thus, internal
domestic politics may check a nation's efforts to avoid IP arbitrage by
expanding the scope of domestic legal protections.
Nations can also extend the extraterritorial reach of domestic IP

law. 47 U.S. courts regularly invoke a presumption that U.S. laws do not
apply abroad unless Congress has expressly so provided.' That Congress has not yet done so is notable given how much harm U.S. firms
4 Even assuming their enforceability
claim from foreign infringements. "'
35 USC § 271(g).
See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global Computer Networks, 68 Tulane L Rev 1, 63 (1993).
44 The shield applies "unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement
on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product." 35 USC
§ 271(g).
42

43

45

Id.

See, for example, Band and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial at 31-39,332-34 (cited in note 9)
(documenting the conflicting views toward IP regulation of Microsoft and Sun Microsystems).
47 See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism. 37 Va J Intl L 505. 506 (1997) ("Courts in the United States are increasingly being
asked to apply the federal patent, copyright, and trademark statutes to conduct that takes place
outside of the country's territorial boundaries.").
48 See id at 507. The Federal Circuit, however, has upheld injunctions against foreign activities. See, for example. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 903 F2d 1568,1577-78 (Fed Cir 1990) (enjoining foreign manufacture of infringing
machines "for use in the United States").
49 See, for example. International Intellectual Property Alliance website, online at
http://www.iipa.com (visited Nov 4, 2003) (estimating $12.3 billion in losses from copyright infringement in 49 nations in 2002).
46
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against nonresidents, extending the reach of domestic IP laws extrapolicy. "
territorially may subvert foreign
In sum, domestic and foreign policy considerations are likely to
constrain the ability of a nation to avoid IP arbitrage by amending
domestic laws to broaden import controls or to extend the reach of its
laws beyond its territorial boundaries. Moreover, banning the import
of derivatives, such as products of research tools or products of patented processes, may be difficult to enforce, particularly when the
products do not bear the imprint of the infringement and there is
more than one way to make them."
B.

Putting Pressure on the "Rogue" Nation

Nations affected by an IP arbitrage may also pressure the other
nation to change its law. There is, of course, nothing new about unilateral pressure as a strategy for dealing with perceived inadequacies of
other nations' IP laws or practices. 2 Many expected TRIPS to cause
such pressure to subside,5' and some have even argued that it is inconsistent with TRIPS obligations for member states to engage in unilateral retribution as to matters covered by the TRIPS Agreement.'
The U.S. has been the most active and aggressive user of unilateral pressure to induce changes in other nations' IP laws. Prior to the
adoption of TRIPS, the U.S. implemented procedures for taking action
against nations having IP policies it deemed deficient. The U.S. Trade
Representative has authority to investigate whether particular nations
adequately protect IP rights, and if not, to deny them trade benefits
unless their policies change." It publishes an annual report assigning a
level of priority to the perceived inadequacies of other nations' laws,
and takes prompt action against priority violators." The U.S. has used
these procedures to put considerable pressure on other nations to
change their IP policies both before and after TRIPS."

50 See Bradley, 37 Va J Intl L at 546 (cited in note 47) (noting a strong international reaction to congressional decisions to confer extraterritorial reach to U.S. law).
51 See, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project:
Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 Risk 163,169-70 (1994).
52 See, for example, Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term
Copyright Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 Syracuse J Intl L & Comm 29, 39-46
(1995) (describing U.S. tactics to encourage Taiwan, China, and Thailand to curb copyright and
patent infringement).
53 See Sell, Private Power, Public Law at 165 (cited in note 10).
'A See, for example. J.H. Reichman. The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 Case W Res J Intl L 441,454 (2000).
55 See, for example, Newby, 21 Syracuse J Intl L & Comm at 35-39 (cited in note 52).
56
See Sell. Private Power, Public Law at 92 (cited in note 10).
57 See id at 124-29. See also Newby, 21 Syracuse J Intl L & Comm at 39-50 (cited in note
52) (providing examples).
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Yet unilateral pressure may founder against some trading partners and as to some issues, depending on the clout of the beneficiaries
of the foreign low-protection rule. For example, the E.U. has insisted
on the U.S. adopting stricter rules about geographical origin designations for wine, while the U.S. has demanded that the E.U. broaden the
availability of patents for biotechnology inventions."" Neither bilateral
negotiations nor TRIPS has fully resolved these differences. If the U.S.
objected to IP arbitrage involving interoperable software, the E.U.
would almost certainly resist changes to its policy against enforcement
of license restrictions on reverse engineering given how deliberately
the E.U. developed its Directive on the Legal Protection for Computer Programs to enable competition and innovation in the software
industry. "
Less powerful nations have sometimes repulsed U.S. attempts to
compel the shoring up of lower-protection rules, such as in the context
of developing countries' access to essential medicines. The U.S. put
considerable pressure on South Africa and Brazil to prevent them
from adopting a compulsory licensing scheme for AIDS drugs to
which the pharmaceutical industry objected. "' Counter-pressures, however, arose from alliances among developing countries with similar
concerns, non-governmental organizations concerned with health policy, and a global publicity campaign focusing on the effects of restricting access to essential medicines."' The U.S. eventually backed off, although access to essential medicines remains a hotly contested issue."
Unilateral pressure also undermines incentives for voluntary
compliance with TRIPS. If nations experience equally relentless unilateral pressure after TRIPS as before it, they may believe they have
been denied a key benefit of the bargain they thought they had struck
when agreeing to TRIPS.m
C.

Filing a Complaint with the WTO

Nations aggrieved by a particular form of IP arbitrage may file a
complaint alleging that another WTO member state's low-protection
See Sell, PrivatePower,Public Law at 111-12 (cited in note 10).
See Vinje, Legislative History of the EC Software Directive at 61-63 (cited in note 20).
60 See Sell. Private Power, Public Law at 146-62 (cited in note 10) (describing efforts by
public health groups and consumer activists to construe TRIPS as permitting compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents and the U.S. response).
61
See id at 148-50.
62
See id at 155-58.
63
See, for example, Reichman, 32 Case W Res J Intl L at 458-59 (cited in note 54) (discussing developing countries' possible responses to maximalist interpretations of TRIPS).
64 See Peter M. Gerhart, Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory- TRIPS as a Substantive
Issue, 32 Case W Res J Intl L 357, 368-72 (2000) (modeling TRIPS as an international contract
for which developing nations lack an independent arbiter of substantive validity).
58

59
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rule violates the TRIPS Agreement." A WTO member state may file a

"violation complaint" if another WTO member state has adopted a
measure impairing or nullifying a TRIPS obligation, or a "nonviolation complaint" if "a member state asserts that any objective of
the Agreement is being impeded as a result of any measure applied by

another member state, whether or not it conflicts with the [TRIPS]
Agreement." The complainant's burden is easier to meet in violation
7
cases: breach of a TRIPS obligation is presumed harmful." To win a
non-violation case, by contrast, "the complaining party must demonstrate not only that it suffered a trade injury ... but that it was justified

in relying on the nonoccurrence of that measure or event." Furthermore, there is presently a "working understanding" that non-violation
complaints should not be filed."
Challenging forms of IP arbitrage, such as those discussed in Part
II, as direct violations of TRIPS will, however, be difficult because
they do not involve TRIPS minima. These forms of arbitrage also in-

volve new technology issues as to which there may be no established
international norm for the dispute panel to apply." Even if the mora-

torium on non-violation complaints eventually lapses, winning a nonviolation complaint would be difficult because of the need to prove
both harm and reliance on the other's forbearance from adopting the
low-protection rule. Thus, concerns posed by IP arbitrage may be difficult to resolve through the WTO dispute process.
Proposing More Detailed Harmonization

D.

Nations affected by IP arbitrage may propose that the TRIPS
Agreement be amended to incorporate additional, more detailed
See, for example, David Palmeter, National Sovereignty and the World Trade Organization, 2 J World Intel Prop 77, 79-82 (1999) (discussing the dispute settlement process). A flow
chart of the WTO dispute settlement process can be found at World Trade Organization, The
Panel Process, online at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/tife/disp2_e.htm (visited
Nov 4,2003).
66 Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va J Intl L at 283 (cited in note 14).
See id.
67
Id at 284.
68
Gerhart, 32 Case W Res J Intl L at 384 (cited in note 64).
69
A WTO panel may deem an IP rule to be a TRIPS minimum standard even if not ex70
pressly required by TRIPS if the rule, by consensus, is a well-established international norm of IP
law. See, for example. Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va J Intl L at 289-91 (cited in note 14). The
WTO Appellate Body has rejected arguments premised on disappointment of competitive expectations as a basis for claiming a violation of TRIPS. See Reichman, 32 Case W Res J Intl L at
448 (cited in note 54).
71 TRIPS is silent on anticircumvention laws and regulation of technologies with substantial noninfringing uses. Nor does it directly address research tools or software reverse engineering. But see Charles McManis, Taking TRIPS on the Information Superhighway:InternationalIntellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Technology, 41 Vill L Rev 207, 232-52
(1996) (setting forth possible arguments that TRIPS permits reverse engineering of software).
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minimum standards. 2 Amending TRIPS to increase the level of IP
protection required of WTO members, however, will not be easy.' Article 71(2) provides that TRIPS may be amended to adjust member
state obligations to higher levels of protection when such norms have
been "accepted under [other multilateral] agreements by all Members
of the WTO," after which they can be referred "to the Ministerial Conference for action ... on the basis of a consensus proposal from the

Council for TRIPS."" Negotiations leading up to new multilateral
agreements may take many years.
There are several reasons to believe that proposing more detailed
TRIPS minima to overcome IP arbitrage would encounter resistance.
The lower-protection nation can be expected to oppose any proposal
to override its domestic rule. Insofar as that nation could articulate a
pro-competition, pro-innovation, oi other policy-based rationale for
its rule, it may well win support from other nations. Even if the contested measure does not directly impact developing countries, they
may ally with the lower-protection nation to fend off more finegrained harmonization. Proposing new harmonized standards would,
moreover, open up opportunities for bargaining and concessions that
proponents of higher-protection rules might ultimately find very
costly."
Finally, the norms in TRIPS will almost inevitably be at a sufficiently high level of abstraction that more than one interpretation will
be plausible. No matter how detailed TRIPS minima become, ambiguities and differing interpretations will almost certainly persist, especially given that the emergence of new technologies so frequently
poses interpretive challenges for existing norms.
E.

Choosing Isolation
Nations affected by IP arbitrage may also isolate themselves from
the global trading community or the Internet so that IP arbitrage can72 See Frederick M. Abbott. The Future of the Multilateral Trading System in the Context of
TRIPS, 20 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 661,667-69 (1997) (discussing the process of amending
TRIPS).
73 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporationof International Norms
in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 Ohio St L J 733, 777-82 (2001) (arguing that national
courts should develop substantive bodies of international copyright law to resolve disputes because neither amending TRIPS nor pursuing WTO disputes is likely to achieve international harmonization in light of strong underlying notions of national cultural diversity).
74 TRIPS Art 71(2) at 352 (cited in note 1). See also id Art 71(1) at 352 (permitting the
TRIPS Council to consider modifications or amendments to TRIPS in light of new developments).
75
See Gerhart, 32 Case W Res J Intl L at 360 (cited in note 64) (noting that new rounds of
negotiations for higher levels of protection under TRIPS may create new opportunities and incentives for developing countries to exaggerate the costs of compliance and insist on new concessions).
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not occur." Alternatively, nations can adopt much more restrictive
border control measures or build an elaborate firewall to impede
Internet communications deemed objectionable.77
But isolationism entails considerable costs. An underlying premise of TRIPS and other WTO Agreements is that international trade is
a net positive for member states, their nationals, and the world economy. Self-imposed embargos, virtual or real, prevent domestic firms
from accessing goods and services that may be important to domestic
industrial capabilities."4 They also dampen prospects for foreign investment. Moreover, developing more extensive border controls or
building firewalls will be expensive, with cost rising with restrictivenessY9 The costs of isolationism are likely to be so substantial as to
make this option infeasible for most nations.
Accepting IP Arbitrage

F.

It is, of course, possible for nations confronted with IP arbitrage
simply to accept that the arbitrage has occurred and that their rule is
infeasible to enforce. In some cases, nations can resort to other
mechanisms for enabling domestic innovators to obtain resources
necessary to support R&D in the particular field. For example, public
funding for the development of research tools may provide adequate
incentives for their development, obviating the need for patents to
serve this function."
CONCLUSION

TRIPS has not eliminated economic incentives for nations to
adopt, depending on their domestic circumstances, higher- or lowerprotection rules. Innovators in nations with higher-protection rules
will often, but not always, be able to enjoy at least partial protection in
that nation's market. A lower-protection foreign rule will sometimes
undermine a higher-protection domestic rule by creating incentives to
Only North Korea and Myanmar have chosen not to connect to the Internet. See
Froomkin, Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage at 144 (cited in note 16).
77
See id at 144-46 (describing Vietnamese, Singaporean. and Chinese efforts to control
Internet access).
78
See id at 146:
76

The tighter the filter, the greater the opportunity cost in lost ability to access the rest off
[sic] the world's data.... In order for such a strategy to have any hope of success. [ I the
government must be prepared to resist domestic pressure. pressure from abroad, and especially pressure from foreign firms with local offices that, like those established in Singapore,
are likely to protest loudly at having their data and communications monitored.
79 See id.
80 See. for example, Eisenberg, 5 Risk at 165-75 (cited in note 51) (discussing government
policy with respect to publicly funded research since 1980).
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shift the locus of economic activity to the less protective jurisdiction.
Nations affected by IP arbitrage may encounter difficulties when responding either by adjustments to national rules or by actions in the
international arena.
Whether IP arbitrage is consistent with TRIPS depends on one's
viewpoint. Under a very broad interpretation of TRIPS,"' IP arbitrage
seems inconsistent with TRIPS because such arbitrage frustrates its
objective to enable innovators to recoup R&D investments on a
global basis.' Yet, if one takes the broad view seriously, the most appropriate responses to IP arbitrage would be either to file a WTO
complaint or propose amendments to TRIPS. A WTO complaint
would be unlikely to succeed as long as the working moratorium on
non-violation complaints persists. Unilateral pressure or expansion of
the scope of domestic law or its territorial reach may be much more
likely to succeed than a WTO complaint or a proposal to amend
TRIPS, but these measures would be inconsistent with broadly conceived multilateral obligations.
Under a narrow view, , TRIPS allows broad national discretion to
adopt locally appropriate rules to promote domestic development objectives. Because some nations will have incentives to adopt higherprotection rules and others lower-protection rules, IP arbitrage may
be the inevitable result of economic forces playing themselves out in
the global arena. But if TRIPS obligations are truly minimal, it may be
fair game for nations with higher-protection rules to exert pressure on
nations with low-protection rules or to extend the scope of domestic
protection or territorial reach of domestic laws in an attempt to restore partial protection, given the futility of filing a WTO complaint or
proposing more detailed harmonization.
If neither the broad nor narrow view of TRIPS is indisputable, it
is perhaps understandable that nations with higher-protection rules
would both interpret TRIPS very broadly and continue to pressure
nations with less protective rules to change them, and that developing

81 See, for example, Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a "Bundle" of National Copyright Laws to a SupranationalCode?, 47 J Copyright Socy 265,284 (2000) ("International uniformity of substantive norms favors the international dissemination of works of authorship. If the goal is to foster the world-widest possible audiences for authors in the digital age,
then one might conclude that national copyright norms are vestiges of the soon-to-be bygone
analog world.").
82
Although the WTO Appellate Body has rejected a "competitive expectations" test as a
measure of TRIPS violations, see note 70, that may change if the moratorium on non-violation
complaints lapses.
8- See, for example, Reichman, 32 Case W Res J Intl L at 448 (cited in note 54) (concluding
that "TRIPS law consists essentially of the negotiated rules and no more" and arguing for a
"strict constructionist" interpretation of TRIPS obligations).
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nations would both view TRIPS narrowly and yet also object to at-

tempts to strongarm them into adopting higher-protection rules."'

IP arbitrage may neither be inherently at odds with TRIPS nor

inherently compatible with TRIPS, but perhaps sometimes at odds,
and sometimes compatible, depending on its economic effects." IP arbitrage is a manifestation of competition among higher- and lowerprotection rules in the global economy; a higher-protection rule may
sometimes be necessary to create adequate incentives for particular
classes of innovation, and sometimes not. If lower-protection rules
promoting research uses, interoperability, the public domain, and related values are economically sound, then as long as at least one na-

tion adopts them, beneficiaries may include not only residents of the
adopting nation, but those of other nations that can obtain access to
products via the Internet or through the normal operation of international trade. For those concerned that very strong IP rules are impeding innovation, competition, and other societal goals,7 as well as for
those who believe that "user rights" should become part of the TRIPS
agenda, IP arbitrage may provide some good news.

See Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va J Intl L at 281 (cited in note 14) ("[T]he architects of
84
the TRIPS Agreement used words-and a concept of minimum standards-that allowed each
state to read into the Agreement what it wished to see.").
8-5 See, for example, Steven P. Croley and John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 Am J Intl L 193,208-09 (1996) (arguing that deference to national decisionmaking on IP rules is appropriate, except when "selfserving interpretations of the Agreement that are arguably but not persuasively faithful to the
text" would "erode the Agreement through interpretation").
86
IP arbitrage may also serve as some, albeit incomplete, check on the public choice problem with intellectual property rules in high-protection jurisdictions.
87 See, for example, Reichman, 32 Case W Res J Intl L at 450-51 (cited in note 54) (discussing developing countries' concerns about TRIPS's social costs).
88 See, for example, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round I: Should Users Strike
Back?, 71 U Chi L Rev 21 (2004).

